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A CONVERSATION WITH HANS-GEORG GADAMER
Conducted and translated by Michael Baur
Baur: In face of the problem of the historicity of human
thought, several philosophers who have been influenced by
Thomism have tried to steer a course out of what for them is
relativism. Some of them claim the following: even if all our
knowledge appears to be historically determined and therefore
possibly revisable, there remains still a kind of non-objectify-
ing "reflection" in our conscious acts on the basis of which it
is possible to construct a phenomenologically-grounded and non-
revisable metaphysics. Lonergan is one example of this kind of
thinking. In your own work, you have also emphasized this form
of non-objectifying reflection, for example in the Kleine
Schriften. But you are not so optimistic about the possibility
of such an unrevisable metaphysics. Why not?
Gadamer: Because it cannot be made into an "actus signatus,"
and that means "objectified." The philosophical development of
the modern age has been determined by the fact of modern
science. Since then, the old idea of a comprehensive science
which one might call "philosophy" or "metaphysics" has been
razed to the ground. In the modern age, we speak of "metaphy-
sics" following upon an epoch -- the Greek and the Christian,
that is, the medieval Christian -- in which there was no science
other than the Aristotelian. Given the standpoint of modern
science -- within which Descartes might be named as the leading
theorist -- how can one still think one knows, that is, with the
claim "It is real knowing?" In this sense, I share the question
with the Socratic tradition. I also ask this. I have not said
that it's no longer possible to ask in this way. But it is no
longer possible to integrate science like Hegel tried to do.
I also say: no metaphysics which does not somehow recognize
the different sorts of knowing apart from explanatory science
can exist for me. The formulation which you have chosen in
connection with Lonergan reminds me very much, all too much, of
this huge divergence between what Popper calls "essentialism"
and the experiential standpoint of the modern age. Here is the
problem, and solving it remains the task of philosophy. But
that is the reason why I cannot enter on the one side. I have
to consider both sides: both this theory of non-objectified
thought ~ the fact that a mediation, a crossing-over, an
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effectiveness from the one side to the other must also be
thought out. And what we in the modern age have experienced
there, "philosophical metaphysics" so to speak, finds its
extreme expression in Hegel. That was not very encouraging for
a lasting mediation.
~: You have had some direct contact with Bernard Lonergan,
haven't you?
Gadamer: Oh, yes. And I Ive read his work, especially his
second book, in which he criticizes me a bit. But Lonergan was
not someone who could discuss. He could talk; he was a fas-
cinating talker. But he really couldn't discuss. But on a
friendship-basis, we got along with one another very well.
There was never any problem between us in that way.
Baur: In order to defend the ~nrevisability of a form of human
knowledge, neo-Thomists appeal frequently to a certain distinc-
tion, namely the distinction between what is historically
determined, and what for them is not historically determined,
for example the unrestrictedness of our questioning.
Gadamer: I recognize that. But the unrestrictedness of our
questioning is always the unrestrictedness of our specifically
conditioned questioning, and that means specifically relative
questioning.
Baur: Would you say that there is no "pure question" in Loner-
gan's sense?
Gadamer: Yes, so far as I follow the intention of your ques-
tion.
~: What would you say about the Thomist interpretation of the
Aristotelian doctrine of the "intellectus agens"?
Gadamer: I do not deny that in every thinkable world two times
two is four. The question, however, remains: is that a know-
ledge of reality? I would say that reason moves within itself
here. Thomism deals with the "intellectus agens" just as I
recognize that two times two is four. That means that reflec-
tion moves within itself here.
~: But you would want to ask whether that is knowledge of
reality.
Gadamer:
something.
Yes. Numbers are not realities. But still they are
Take, for example, the prime numbers. It can be
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proved in mathematics that the prime numbers will go on to
infinity. And nevertheless, reason moves here within itself.
That is the "intellectus agens." I cannot see how some other
approach would suffice, unless one appeals to the Creator-like
character of the "intellectus agens." But then one would be
God.
Baur: Thomas suggests something about the creative character of
the "intellectus agens."
Gadamer: That's something different. I'm speaking of creation
itself, not about "a little bit" of this or that. Of course it
is creative when I count out the prime numbers. But that is the
notion of the "creative" in a mild form. My argumentation has
tried to show that the "intellectus agens" naturally has its
function within this truth-dimension of reason -- as I myself
have learned from Aristotle. But please, is that reality? For
that, we would need the Creator.
Baur: Over against neo-Thomism you have written (and I quote):
"The attempt to contrast the realist Aristotle with the idealist
Plato, an attempt motivated by the neo-Thomist critique of
modern idealism, has fallen apart completely" [1].
Gadamer: Yes. It's pure nonsense to say that Aristotle was a
realist and that Plato was an idealist.
Baur: I take it that you are referring in this quote primarily
to the recent philological as well as philosophical research.
Gadamer: Yes. These concepts, "realism" and "idealism" in the
modern sense, are not even to be found in Thomas himself.
That's all part of the influence of the reception of Thomism in
the nineteenth century. And how that was done is not so
terribly inspiring. I can get along much better with st. Thomas
himself. You know that there is a section on Thomas in my book
Truth and Method.
~: Yes. Lonergan wrote a book on "verbum" in Thomas --
Gadamer: In order to show that I don't see things correctly?
You know, I really haven't read Lonergan sUfficiently. That
book Insight is §Q comprehensive and has such small print, that
with myoId eyes I could just no longer manage.
~: In connection with the issue of the neo-thomist inter-
pretation of Aristotle,. I would like to turn now to the doctrine
of matter or materiality. In your article "Gibt es die Ma-
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terie?" you write (and 1'm quoting selectively from the pas-
sage) : "When Aristotle says that matter is the cause of
deformities in nature or of the 'individuality' of the specimen
of a 'kind, I I do not think of matter, but rather that there is
always a determinate being there, an essence which through its
determinate 'eidos' is clearly distinguished from lions or
insects. I am also prepared to conceive of the fertilized egg
from which the embryo and then the newborn infant develop. But
to conceive of matter as becoming that -- that is not given to
me" [2].
Gadamer: Yes. What I say there is good Aristotle. The idea
that matter is the cause or principle of individuation is not an
Aristotelian doctrine. Or can you show me where the concept of
the principle of individuation is to be found in Aristotle?
~: I thought that it was' there in the Metaphysics.
Gadamer: Yes, but what is that passage supposed to mean? The
idea of matter as the cause of individuation is not an Aris-
totelian doctrine. Otherwise I might be able to find some sense
in the distinction between idealism and realism. But I see no
sense in that. When Aristotle speaks of individuation, he means
a material being, and not matter as such. When he speaks about
the matter as such, then he speaks quite differently. The
"hyle" is the "dynameion" and nothing else. It is "that out of
which."
I am not saying that Aristotle was an idealist. I am
saying rather that it is a complete misunderstanding to speak of
idealism and realism in this connection. That's modern epis-
temology, but neither Aristotle nor Thomas.
~: You have also written that the meaning of a text does not
lie simply in the intention of the author. Why then should such
an appropriation of Thomas, for example, be inappropriate and
sUbject to criticism, namely the appropriation of the philosophy
of Thomas in face of the epistemological problems of the modern
age?
Gadamer: Because then one makes Thomas a dummy instead of a
genius. He did not ask these questions; he saw the world
differently.
Of course, when it comes to the question of a natural
theology, then one might have some serious thoughts, even from
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my point of view. But without revelation Thomas would not have
wanted to be a Christian. He was not a gnostic.
Baur: A related question has to do with the issue of the
"ground" of human finitude. According to the Thomist tradition,
the ground of the finitude of human knowledge is connected with
what is meant by materiality.
Gadamer: I don't understand what that's supposed to mean. Our
finitude has something to do with death, in any case. Let's
make it simpler for ourselves.
Baur: Maybe I can explain what I mean. The human "intellectus"
is potentially all beings. But in actual fact it does not
become all beings; it can become this or that being only,
because of its essential dependence on materiality.
Gadamer: So you mean the Aristotelian concept of "hyle." I
know now what you mean. You have referred to my article, "Gibt
es die Materie?" In that article, I am not suggesting any kind
of idealistic evaporation of reality. I am asking rather, "What
did Aristotle really mean?" "To live in the 'logoi"': the
expression in Greek philosophy from Socrates to Plato to
Aristotle -- even in Aristotle -- implies as self-evident that
it's a misunderstanding of philosophy itself if one believes
that philosophy can deny the natural experience of reality. We
attempt instead to think about what is experienced there, that
is, what you're calling materiality. But if we accept that
simply as such, then I don't think it's right since then we end
up immediately with all the problems of modern relativism.
Baur: So what I have been calling matter or materiality --
Gadamer: Those are
it is to be human.
objectifiable, for
weighing.
Baur: Some neo-Thomist philosophers have tried to explain the
phenomenon of being-in-the-world ("In-der-welt-Sein") on the
basis of the materiality of human existence. In terms of
explanation, materiality is for them prior to the experienced
phenomenon of being-in-the-world. It seems to me that the
priority is the other way around for you and for Heidegger: for
you, the phenomenon of being-in-the-world is prior, and our talk
of materiality, etc. is really only an abstraction which is
founded on our modes of being-in-the-world in the first place.
categories with which one cannot grasp what
With those categories I can grasp what is
example through measuring, counting, and
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Would you say that these attempts to explain the phenomenon of
being-in-the-world on the basis of materiality are senseless?
Gadamer: We can try to see things from the other side. The
primary issue which we have before us is the following: "Why
are we actually in such a critical world situation? What has
modern science actually brought about?" Science has indeed
brought something about when it looks down upon every form of
thought which does not belong to the laws of methodical objec-
tifiability. How has modern thought actually come to that? One
can point to Calvinism as the actual determining world-power of
our technical civilization. It's there in Max Weber. Even when
I'm simplifying here, you know what I mean. And when one does
that, then one must also ask oneself whether things had been
inadequately thought out at the beginning.
I'm a Platonist. I am -not, a Thomist, and so rather an
Augustinian, if you will. What I mean about finitude is already
there in Plato in black and white. It's in the symposium.
Philosophy is not "sophia." It is a striving after the true.
"The eternal reproduction of our knowledge," that's all in
Plato. But it would be completely wrong if you interpret that
as relativism, since then you would be taking the concepts from
modern science as your measure.
Baur: You have said that you are familiar with Lonergan's book
Method in Theology. What do you think of his appropriation of
your work there? Would you say that this was not a real
grappling with your own work?
Gadamer: No, I cannot say that. You see, we are all finite
creatures. And so when Lonergan appropriates my work in his own
way -- and in a very friendly manner, I would like to emphasize
that -- then it is natural that within a completely different
conceptual framework it should be so transformed. And then it's
quite difficult to recognize it once again as my work. However,
I am very far from saying that he did not understand me. It
would be very presumptuous to express oneself in that way. I
would say only this: the problem of relativism sits much deeper
in all of us.
It is a life-long task to ask oneself: "Must it be so, that
modern science can demand atheism of us?" I cannot believe that
it has to be so. And thus I am a Platonist. And where do the
mistakes lie, such that the modern world has become this way?
Then I say: in the inadequacy of the appropriation of the Greek
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philosophy through the Christian church. That was an inadequate
appropriation.
Let me ask you: what is the Greek word for "will," for
"voluntas"? There is none. It doesn't exist in Greek. It's a
voluntarism to think everything in Latin. That's one of the
points that Heidegger made. He had gotten to know a Thomistic
Aristotle at first. Then he read Meister Eckhart and Luther,
and then he read Aristotle. And there is no "voluntas" in
Aristotle, as is so often claimed.
Baur: Given that background, one can understand a bit better
why Heidegger so often equates the philosophy of sUbjectivity
with late- and post- medieval philosophy.
Gadamer: What is meant here above all is modernity: sUbject is
still sUbstance, only under a different name.
In order to understand Heidegger, one has to go deeper into
Plato and Aristotle. The finitude of human existence is not a
Heideggerian invention. Heidegger certainly did not invent
death!
Concerning the question to which Heidegger dedicated his
entire life: he did not find an answer. Whoever thinks that
Heidegger knew better has not understood Heidegger. Heidegger
did not know it any better. But what he did see is that the
Christian message, so interpreted through Aristotelianism, has
brought about the modern world, along with everything for which
it stands. These are some of the first things that I learned
from Heidegger. He used to quote Adolf Harnack concerning the
infiltration of Christianity by Greek philosophy, and so forth.
That was Heidegger's question.
All in all, I would say: the basic fact of the modern world
is modern science. We must deal with things in such a way, so
that science does not become everything. But how are we to
achieve that? Unfortunately, we cannot achieve that if we
remain Thomists. For then we already share too many pre-
suppositions out of which modern science itself has developed.
Baur: However, Thomists certainly share a sensibility for the
problem which you pose.
Gadamer: But of course. Oh, thank God -- otherwise one could
not even talk to them.
~: But what you have said is probably one of the strongest
criticisms that one can make against the neo-Thomists.
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Gadamer: Yes. The alliance with modern science within neo-
Thomism was deadly. Give me classical Thomism instead.
Baur: This "alliance" with modern science is supposed to be one
of the very strengths of Lonergan's philosophy, as it has been
understood.
Gadamer: Yes, a bit like Hegel.
Baur: You mean that Hegel also shared too many presuppositions
with modern science.
Gadamer: Yes. In this sense Hegel is still a Cartesian. I am
not as great a thinker as Heidegger was, so I am a bit cautious
when I say this: I'm not quite sure whether I perhaps might be
able to admit that Hegel was in part right. But Heidegger knew
for sure that he couldn't do that.
Then again, it would be 'a Thomism to try to think in the
Greek way where one can no longer do so. That is to say, when
one is Hegel, when one fuses Christianity into a concept. A
conceptualized Christianity -- that is a gnosis tor the real
Christian. And indeed Christian Baur had already criticized
Hegel for that. And one would probably be able to, and have to,
criticize Lonergan in the same way. But that's not my area.
Of course, Thomas is not as unambiguous as one often
teaches within Thomism. He had a strong Augustinian moment as
well. But of course when you speak of Thomism as a form of
thought in general, then that immediately falls apart once
again. You saw at the beginning how I always tried to respond
by asking whether you do not make yourselves gnostics, whether
you do not elevate yourselves to the point of self-divinization,
when you want to know so exactly that which you do not know
exactly. Hegel as a gnostic, that's what Christian Baur
claimed. He dealt with Hegel and Plotinus together. You know,
plotinus' "self-redemption of the soul through knowledge," and
so forth. Christianity did not accept that, and of course
Augustine did not accept that. But it remains a constant
temptation, and such comes up once again with Hegel.
~: You mentioned that Thomism as a form of thought in
general falls apart.
Gadamer: Yes, it collapses necessarily with the modern En-
lightenment. Thomism fails to deal with something in the
Enlightenment, and indeed cannot deal with it. No one, in fact,
has found an answer. I can very well see that one can be a
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believing Christian and that one can at the same time live in
the world of modern science. But how one can do that is a
mystery to me. For me, one must really learn to be able to do
without having a theology.
On one level, I would see the cases of Hegel and Lonergan
in a very parallel fashion: he attempts to deal conceptually
with the Christian mysteries, yet without becoming gnostic.
That is the task of the Christian theologian. And gnosis
remains the danger in every theology. Now Plato is something
that I can handle -- I know what that means: "to theion." That
is something, and one cannot explain that away with some modern
materialism or what not. But whether I know more, "ho theos,"
as Aristotle says, that seems to me to be a very suspicious
adaptation. with Aristotle I am quite sceptical. Does he
really mean that? Or isn't he just following a folk religion in
this case? Aristotle was not an "anima naturaliter christiana."
One could apply that term to Plato, if one needs to apply it.
~: You have said that the danger of the modern age lies in
the possibility that the way of modern science should become the
only way of thought at all.
Gadamer: Yes, and so I go back, even behind Thomas and behind
Aristotle. In my eyes, it begins with Aristotle's Physics; that
is a magnificent program. And one can always renew it in
different romantic varieties, as was done in German Romanticism,
and as is now being done with "anthroposophy" and such things.
There's always the same need: we want to live once again in one
world. I've written an essay called "Burger zweier Welten"
("Citizens of Two Worlds"). In that essay I insist that it
won't work. If we do not have any other resources, we can only
admit to ourselves that science is a unified body that is closed
within itself and obeys only its own laws. The "self-limitation
of science" cannot be derived from science itself; anyone who is
a scientist is always more than just a scientist.
Baur: This whole issue of limitation returns us in a way to the
question of the ground of human finitude. It's what has been
called "hyle," the "always-nat-yet" in human existence.
Gadamer: Yes, yes. That is the finitude of human existence.
We are not Creators.
~: And what the neo-Thomists call "matter" or "materiality"
is also a concept for that.
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Gadamer: Oh yes. Good. Go on.
~: But why can't one also speak of matter or materiality --
as is done in neo-Thomism -- in connection with the individua-
tion of different instances of the same form?
Gadamer: Do you know, for example, how one would then have to
conceive of the congruence theorems? So there you have two
congruent triangles. And where is the matter? The point here
is that that's really an eidetic plurality. Aristotle found
himself thus forced to speak of a "hyle noete." Just think of
that: a non-sensible matter. And in modern science that's what
is called extension. In modern science extension is the prin-
ciple of individuation -- space and time. The source of that is
in Aristotle, that is, in Aristotle's Physics. One cannot deny
that the consequence of that starting point has become modern
science. One can, of course, ask just ~ it has turned out that
way.
Within the realm of Christian belief, for example, Heideg-
ger was a thoughtful, doubting young man. He learned his neo-
Thomism but he was not at ease with the modern world. And then
he turned to Luther, and then to Gabriel Biel, and to Augustine.
And then he finally tried to discern to what extent one could
still believe. He recognized that it may very well go beyond
what one can know for oneself. In this sense, the church would
proclaim a truth. But it is very dangerous when one believes
that one knows this truth. Then that's almost Calvinism: one is
chosen.
I have lived now for a long time with the question: "What
will become of this world if non-Christian religions should stop
only imitating us, so to speak, with their I European room'?"
You know that the Japanese have a so-called "European room" in
their houses. When they walk around in the streets, it's always
"American tailor-made" and so forth. But when they come home,
they change. Then they live in a Japanese house. The "European
room" is only for guests. That's a symbol for this duplicity
which is upheld there. It's the same thing with Shintuism and
their ancestral religions. They have not been spoiled with
theology.
~: And so one lives in two worlds.
Gadamer: Or to express it even better: the world of science is
not a world at all. It is a field for our activities, for our
struggle for survival against nature. And such alone is not
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truly human being. The expression "citizens of two worlds" is
a Kantian expression. On the one hand there is causality and
modern science; and on the other hand, there is the moral law
and freedom. Those are two worlds, and one cannot explain one
on the basis of the other.
Baur: You said that the danger in the modern age has to do with
the possibility that the way of modern science will become the
only way of thinking at all.
Gadamer: Yes. That is the problem of our modern Enlightenment.
Baur: But you also consider it possible that such won't happen.
Gadamer: I take it for almost certain that humanity would much
sooner destroy itself before modern science really dominates so
completely. I find transcendence -- that is to say, the neces-
sity, based on our own finitude, that we think this out -- so
rooted in human nature. Now you can interpret that theological-
ly; that is a bit more than I care to do. However, I do take it
as completely certain that we can think this out.
By the way, Heidegger never doubted that. You know he had
something of a Joachimistic theology. That's a spiritualistic
theology of the mediators sent to mankind from the divine. That
is to say, a H6lderlinistic theology. I prefer to call it
Joachimistic, because that's where the source is. Joachimism:
revelation is a succession of communications. The new book by
Heidegger which has just appeared as part of his collected works
-- it's called Beitrage zur Philosophie -- ends with a passage
about "the God who passes by." But it's not as if God is being
doubted here.
Baur: One often reads the famous quote from the Spiegel
interview
Gadamer: "Only a God can save us"
Baur: as an expression of doubt.
Gadamer: In my view, Heidegger was always a bit high-flown in
his manner of expression, and that applies to this case as well.
"Only a God can save us." But then again, we really don't know
that either. Maybe he meant the following: "We cannot save
ourselves through the consummation of our scientific, technical
civilization. The attempt to do so would only tighten the
bottleneck in which we are now stuck."
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That probably has a religious meaning; but, then again, not
a theological meaning. It had meaning for him: "I don't know
how we are to get beyond this modern world; I know only that we
are finite creatures." I never really spoke with him about that
quote. I simply tried to learn from him, given the limits
within which I could. And now I try to carryon. My main
support is the fact that I go back to the pre-modern world. If
I had been educated within the Thomist tradition, I would
probably discover as Heidegger did, that there's a completely
different Aristotle, one quite different from the one that was
taught for example in 1900, and is still being taught today.
And I would go from neo-Thomism back to classical Thomism, just
as I've already done a bit in my book with that section on
"verbum." It has been accepted in the neo-Thomist tradition up
to now. And similarly, I see that whole attempt at systematiza-
tion in the Counter-Reformation as very suspect.
I read just the other day that Carl Friedrich von Weiz-
sacker has recently won this huge prize for "progress in science
and religion." Weizsacker: he is an outstanding physicist and
a Christian. And it's right that he won that prize, for he did
not try to make it easy by constructing some kind of theology of
reconciliation or mediation. No, there are still two worlds,
one of which is not really a world at all. Science is a sector
of the world, and it's pretty bad that we now regulate our
social life as if science were the whole world. I mean, when
everything is done with statistics, technology, and so on. For
then where is genuinely human life?
~: But you still believe it to be unlikely that such
scientific, technical thinking will become the only way of
thinking.
Gadamer: That, I believe, is out of the question.
annihilate ourselves before that happens.
We'll
~: But why do you believe it's out of the question?
Gadamer: Science will never abolish death. If it were able to
do that, then it could happen. You see, I have no actual
solution. I am only saying that those who claim to have a
solution also have none. Heidegger also knew that he hadn't
achieved it, and so his later life was a bit darkened. That was
his life-long task: he wanted to come to grips with Nietzsche.
He wanted to say: "No, that's not all that there is, this 'will
to power,' this fatalism, this 'eternal recurrence of the same, ,
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'the last man,' and so forth." And now you're asking me just
why "the last man" is not in fact the only end of history.
Baur: You're referring to "the last man" in the "Preface" to
Nietzsche's Zarathustra.
Gadamer: Yes. And you're asking me why I don't believe that
that's the end of history.
Baur: Yes. And what's the reason for the hope, even when we
know that science will never abolish death?
Gadamer:
would like
Christian.
Yes, where does the reason for the hope lie?
to know that. One can know that as a believer,
But one cannot mediate that intellectually.
One
as a
Baur: Professor Gadamer, thank you very much for this oppor-
tunity to speak with you.
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